We study two issues relating to the conduct of environmental policy in developing countries (DCs). First, when faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it run a deficit/surplus? Second, given recent findings about the dynamic inconsistency of optimal environmental policy, should an EA make its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production public, or should it keep its preferences private? Our analysis reveals that when faced with a self-financing constraint, it is optimal for the EA to run a deficit/surplus. Second, social losses are lower when this EA keeps its preferences private.
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary times, the connections between the environment and development have come to dominate academic and public debate in most parts of the world. Three principal issues have been articulated by scholars working in this area. First, Bhalla (1992) , Renner (1992) and Mehmet (1995) have made the case that it is important for developing countries (hereafter DCs) to implement policies that generate employment. Second, Goldin and Winters (1995) and Faucheux et al. (1996) , and more generally the sizeable literature on sustainable developmental have stressed the need for instituting policies that protect the environment for the present and the future generations. Third, Batabyal (1998), Batabyal and Beladi (1999) and Lee and Batabyal (1999) have pointed out that under certain circumstances, employment creation and environmental protection are competing goals. What this means is that although DCs may begin the process of implementing environmental policies, over time, their commitment to such policies is likely to wane.
The purpose of this paper is to study two aspects of the above mentioned third issue. We analyze these two aspects by developing an alternate theoretical framework from that employed in Batabyal (1998), Batabyal and Beladi (1999) and Lee and Batabyal (1999) . One of the key findings of these three papers is that in a dynamic setting, it is generally optimal for an environmental authority (hereafter EA) to alter the magnitude of pollution taxes over time. However, in many DCs, once pollution taxes have been set, from a political perspective, it is difficult to change-and in particular to raise-them.: Further, on account of litigation, the need to grant subsides, and other reasons, EAs in many DCs incur substantial *Corresponding author. E-mail: aabgsh@rit.edu *For more on this literature, the reader should consult Atkinson et al. (1997), Farmer and Randall (1997) , Pezzey (1997) and Heal (1998) . *For more on this in the case of India, see Dwivedi, (1997, p. 103 and p. 203) . Environmental litigation in China is discussed in Sinkule and Ortolano (1995) . Dwivedi (1997 ), Mehta et a1.(1997 See Sinkule and Ortolano (1995, pp. 131-133) for subsidies in China and Dwivedi, (1997, pp. 118-121) Batabyal (1998) , Batabyal and Beladi (1999) and Lee and Batabyal (1999) . These Barro (1979) . As in Batabyal (1998) 
There are two other constraints on the EA's problem. The first is the polluting sector's budget constraint. This constraint is (3) The second constraint arises from the nature of the EA's optimization problem. Because the subjective time preference factor equals the market discount factor (/3 1/(1 + r)), the representative consumer's Euler equation for consumption in any two time periods s and s + 1 is** u'(G) u'(Cs+), (4) where the prime denotes a derivative.
IIEven when a legal proceeding has been instituted against non-compliant polluting firms, there is no assurance that this legal proceeding will result in success. For instance, In India, the prosecution success rate in 1992 in air and water pollution cases was 65 and 62%, respectively, (Mehta et al. 1997, pp. 23-24) .
#For more on the practical effects of budget constraints on the activities of EAs in China and India, see Sinkule and Ortolano (1995, p. 29) and Dwivedi (1997, pp. 124-125) , respectively. **Note that consumption may be direct or indirect. For instance, in India, paper and sugar production are highly polluting activities (see Mehta et al., 1997, pp. 10-108) . It is clear that in the case of sugar, consumption is direct. However, with regard to paper, consumption may be direct or indirect. **The reader will note that this rules out the possibility of the EA lobbying for additional funds. **For more on this, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996.p. 3).
Analysis and Results
The EA maximizes Eq. (2) subject to the constraints given in Eqs. (1) 
and
Equation (6) tells us that at the optimum, the marginal utility of consumption equals the shadow value of the polluting sector's resources. Equation (7) It is important to note that both the shadow value of the EA's resources (3/) and the private value of consumption (u/(6)) are constant over time. This means that in our model, optimal pollution taxes are also constant over time. Put differently, like the representative consumer--who finds it optimal to smooth consumption over time--the EA also finds it optimal to smooth pollution taxes over time.
The constant pollution tax can be computed from Eq. (7). 
CREDIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Preliminaries
One of the tasks of the EA of the previous section is to set appropriate pollution taxes rt. In turn, these pollution taxes directly affect qt, the production of the polluting good, and indirectly affect pollution xt. In order to work with pollution directly, we suppose that the functional relationships between xt, qt, and rt are strictly monotonic. Formally, this will enable us to treat pollution and not pollution taxes as the EA's control variable. More informally, this will permit us to think of the EA as a "command-and-control" entity that sets pollution levels directly. Moreover, because we want to work with a loss function, it will be helpful to think of the EA as an entity that sets pollution levels (the bad) directly.
To 
The first order necessary condition to this problem is (12) xt(O)I1 +pq-I O.
IIIIThis kind of loss function has been used in the monetary economics literature by Barro and Gordon (1983) Backus and Driffil (1985) , and others. For a good account of dynamic consistency issues in monetary economics, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 634-658) .
##For an alternate perspective on commitment in environmental policy in DCs, see Batabyal (1998) 
We can now determine whether society is better or worse off with the EA committing to environmental policy. The relevant equations to compare are Eqs. (14) and (19 A salient implication of Proposition 3 is that the EA will actually prefer a system that mandates secrecy about its true preferences regarding the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production of the polluting good. In his book on environmental policy in India, Dwivedi, (1997, p. 104) has noted that many environmental laws "confer enormous discretionary powers on administrative authorities." Propositions 2 and 3 together tell us that in general, this is not a good idea. In particular, our analysis shows that from the DC's perspective, it is better to have an EA that displays commitment to its environmental policy so that the polluting "industries know what to expect [and] how far to go with respect to changing their production processes..." (Dwivedi, 1997, p. 216) .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyzed two hitherto unstudied questions about the conduct of environmental policy in Des. First, in the second section, we established the proposition that when faced with a self-financing constraint, an EA should set a constant pollution tax over time. In particular, this means that when its expenditures are unusually high, it is optimal for this EA to run a deficit. Similarly, when its expenditures are unusually low, the EA should run a surplus.
Next, in the third section, we analyzed the notion of credibility in environmental policy. We first demonstrated that environmental policy with commitment results in lower social losses than does discretionary environmental policy. Recently, in the context of India, Dwivedi, (1997, p. 208) has argued that one way to improve environmental policy would be to increase the public's awareness of the different aspects of environmental regulation. In contrast, our analysis shows that society is better off when an EA keeps its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production private. This tells us that a certain amount of secrecy in the conduct of environmental policy is a good thing.
The analysis of this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what follows, we suggest two possible extensions. First, one could expatiate upon the model of the second section by studying the properties of the EA's optimal tax policy when its expenditures are endogenous. Second, with regard to the model of the third ***Note that it makes sense to perform this computation because on date 2, the EA itself does not know the true value of Or. section, it would be useful to study what effects more general loss functions have on the result that it is optimal for the EA to keep its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production secret. Studies which incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide richer accounts of the theory of environmental policy in DCs.
